Kantai Kessen

Kantai Kessen (Omārese 艦隊決戦, or "naval fleet decisive battle") is a military doctrine developed by the Imperial Omāri Navy.

Background
Omāri Robusutā has traditionally been influenced by the Humerlandish doctrine of "big guns, big ships". Following the foundation of the West Carthage Company, it decided that the fleet of 2 protected cruisers, 4 torpedo boats, and 3 submarines was inadequate to maintain its sphere of influence in the Orient, particularly as it prepared to attack the Aliturian remnant, which would likely cause war with Haluria. It decided to model a fleet off Humerland. This involved building the pre-dreadnought battleships Mikasa and Asahi, as well as the Azuma-class protected cruisers and Achilles-class armoured cruisers. These would be built by J. Faulkner & Sons of Whitsteen, a Humerlandish engineering firm responsible for building most of Humerland's navy, as Omāri Robusutā lacked the resources to build them herself. They arrived in 1904, in time for a war with Haluria, which never occurred.

Overview
Kantai Kessen prioritises large, heavy ships such as battleships and large cruisers, used to "knock out" an enemy fleet in a few decisive battles. It is based on experience by Humerland. Said warships were to be as large and powerful as possible, as quality was perceived by the Admiralty to be superior to quantity.

The doctrine centres on a single decisive battle, or a few decisive battles. Any enemy engaging Omāri Robusutā would likely have at least two oceans to patrol; as such, on average only half the fleet could operate at any one time. Therefore, the Imperial Omāri Navy need only have a fleet half the size of Humerland or the WCC; less, if its ships are of a very high quality. In the event of a war, ships would need to be deployed from a port, likely thousands of kilometres away. It would often need to travel through pinch points such as the canals, which would be patrolled by submarines. The journey to Omāri Robusutā would be dangerous and would buy time for the Omāri fleet to prepare. With good tactical planning, victory would be easy. The size and range of the ship's guns would be the key factor; engaging the enemy outside of their gun-range would likely win the battle, and hence the war.

Criticism
Some have pointed to the inadequacy of the current Omāri fleet to actually perform such a battle; they possess two out-of-date pre-dreadnoughts with 6 armoured cruisers and a handful of protected cruisers and smaller ships.

However, at present Omāri Robusutā is waiting on orders of 12 dreadnoughts and 14 battlecruisers. This may be switched to 8 dreadnoughts and 8 battlecruisers, depending on finances. These would easily be enough to tie up most players or coalitions in the Orientalis.

Also a problem is the fact that a single decisive battle might not be enough to knock out a heavily industrialised enemy. While healing, unless an attack is followed up quickly, an enemy may build another fleet.

The sinking of the Carthaginian fleet by Borogravian submarines highlighted the deficiencies of a large fleet of big-gun ships when compared to masses of torpedo boats and submarines, and especially a big-gun fleet without adequate protection by torpedo boat destroyers. Particularly it showed how a fleet in being, could not project power against a pre-emptive strike by an enemy with submarines (New Carthage, being a peaceful nation, preferred to maintain a small but not inconsiderable fleet in port to exert a controlling influence). These would be easy to manufacture, and would be more effective in a war of attrition although not effective in battle.